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editor's note: The article that follows is a condensation of a
section of Criminal Procedure, a hornbook co-authored by
Professor Israel and Wayne R. Lafave, and published by West
Publishing Co. in 1985. That hornbook, in turn, is a condensation of the authors' three-volume treatise by the same title.

Prior to Faretta, 1 a long line of cases had held that
defense counsel had the authority to make various defense decisions on his own initiative. These decisions,
commonly characterized as relating to matters of "strategy" or "tactics," were said to be within the "exclusive
province" of the lawyer. Counsel had no obligation to
consult with the defendant,2 and if he did consult, had
no obligation to follow the defendant's wishes. 3 Other
defense decisions, however, were said to rest in the ultimate authority of the defendant. As to those decisions, commonly said to require the "personal choice"
of the defendant, counsel had to advise the client and
abide by his directions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Faretta was thought
by some to have altered this basic division between
strategic and personal decisions. The Faretta opinion
had referred to the "law and tradition" that granted
counsel ultimate authority to make 'binding decisions
of trial strategy in many areas." Indeed it had cited that
law and tradition as a factor pointing towards the recognition of an alternative of self-representation where
defendant wanted to control his own destiny. The argument was advanced, however, that the overall perspective of the Faretta opinion also required that the
attorney's ultimate authority be limited, perhaps only
to "on-the-spot" decisions where timing considerations
precluded consultation with the defandant. Faretta, it
was argued, was "predicated on the view that the function of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is to protect the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial by
assisting him in making choices that are his to make,
not to make choices for him, although counsel may be
better able to decide what tactics will be most
effective."
In Jones v. Barnes, 4 a divided Supreme Court rejected
this view of Faretta. Jones held that appellate counsel
did not have to present a nonfrivolous claim that his
client wished to press if counsel believed that the better strategy was to limit his argument and brief to other
issues. Counsel was free to follow the time-tested advice of countless advocates that inclusion of "every colorable claim" will "dilute and weaken a good case and
will not save a bad one." It was for counsel to decide
which claims were strong enough to be presented consistent with this strategy. Faretta gave the defendant an
opportunity to control the presentation of his case by
proceeding prose. Neither it nor decisions defining
the obligation of appointed appellate counsel had altered counsel's right to act upon his best professional
judgment as to matters of strategy.
The issue of client control was raised in Jones through
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. While that

is probably the most common avenue for presenting
that issue, questions of client control also may be
raised in other procedural settings. An indigent defendant may claim that he has a right to appointment of
new counsel because his current attorney refuses to accept his directions on an issue that should be within
defendant's control. A defendant may seek a continuance for the purpose of replacing retained counsel on
the same ground. A substantial number of the leading
opinions on client control have involved collateral attacks raising constitutional claims that were not presented at trial. When the state has argued that the
claim was "waived" bv counsel's failure to raise it at
trial, the petitioner h~s responded that a valid waiver of
that claim required his personal decision and that
counsel had not even consulted with him in deciding
not to raise the issue. Jones left open whether counsel's
strategic decision not to raise on appeal a constitutional
claim urged by defendant would bar consideration of
that claim on collateral attack. However, various other
Supreme Court decisions have held that a counsel's deliberate decision not to raise a particular claim at trial
did bar review on collateral attack, provided that decision dealt with a matter subject to counsel's control
over strategy. Taken as a whole, the cases indicate that,
in piecing together the overall distribution of decisionmaking authority, one usually can assume that rulings
on that subject made in one procedural setting ordinarily will be carried over to other settings as well.
Though the various rulings on client control are not
entirely consistent, they recognize several decisions as
to which defendant's "personal choice" clearly is required. The Supreme Court has stated, in dictum or
holding, that it is for the defendant to decide whether
to take each of the following steps: plead guilty or take
action tantamount to entering a guilty plea;5 waive the
right to jury trial; testify on his own behalf; or forego
an appeal. On the other side, the Supreme Court has
indicated, in dictum or holding, that counsel has the
ultimate authority in deciding whether or not to advance the following defense rights: barring prosecution use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence;
obtaining dismissal of an indictment on the ground of
racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury;
wearing civilian clothes, rather than prison garb, during the trial; striking an improper jury instruction; and
including a particular nonfrivolous claim among the
issues briefed and argued on appeal. Lower court
rulings have added to this list a variety of other
determinations, including the following: whether to
request, or object to, the exclusion of the public from
the trial; whether to seek a change of venue, continuance, or other relief due to prejudicial pretrial publicity; whether to seek a continuance and thereby
relinquish a statutory right to trial within a specified
period; and whether to call a certain witness.
Taken together, the various rulings produce a picture
lttat is clear at many points but clouded at others. General agreement exists that the decisions as to guilty
plea, jury trial, appeal, and the defendant testifying
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are for the defendant, and that decisions on a substantially larger group of matters, such as objecting to inadmissible evidence, are for counsel. As to various other
decisions, however, the courts either have not spoken
or are divided . Thus, Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Jones , was on uncertain ground when he suggested
that a defendant would have the right to insist that his
counsel forego other strategies more likely to produce a
dismissal and rely exclusively on a claim of innocence .
That assumption, though it relates to an issue basic to
the division of responsibility between lawyer and client, is hardly clear under the precedent. Of course,
one cannot expect a ruling on each and every decision
on which lawyer and client are likely to disagree. The
problems of uncertainty are exacerbated, however, by
the absence of any well-reasoned guidelines for distinguishing between those decisions requiring defendant's personal choice and those subject to counsel's
control over strategy.
The Supreme Court's explanations of why particular
decisions are for counsel or client have been brief and
conclusionary. Decisions within the client's control are
simply described as involving "fundamental i:ight~,"
while those within the lawyer's control are said to involve matters requiring the "superior ability of trained
counsel" in assessing "strategy." While the rights subject to defendant's "personal choice" clearly are "fundamental," the Court has not explained why various
rights subject to counsel's authority are not equal_ly
fundamental. Arguably, the decision to plead p1-1ilty
has a special quality because it involves the re_m:iqmshment of so many basic rights. But it is more difficult to
distinguish the right to be tried bef~re a jurr, for example, from the right to present a particular witness or to
cross-examine an opposing witness . If the fundamental nature of a right is measured by its ~mporta_nce: its
historic tradition, or its current status m constitutional
or state law, those rights would appear to be on the
same plane.
.
.
The Court's emphasis upon the strategic eleme~t m
those decisions subject to counsel's control also fails to
fully explain the distinctions that ~ave been drawn.
Certainly the decisions to waive a Jury ?r not hav_e the
defendant testify also involve substantial strategic
considerations. It may be argued that the element~ of
strategy involved in such decisions are more readily
understood by the layman because they do not as frequently rest on technical concerns as many of the tactical decisions made by counsel. But they are har~l_y
distinguishable in this regard from still other dec1s10ns
made by counsel. For example, ~ounsel's decision not
to have a particular witness testify often rests on con- .
siderations of the same kind that would lead counsel~ if
he had such control, to keep the defendant from testifying . Similarly'. ~uch the ~ame type of judgi:nent is
involved in deoding that a Jury should be waived
because the trial judge is likely to be the more sy~pathetic factfinder as in deciding that an unconstitutionally composed ju~y should 1:ot be challenged because discriminatory Jury selection has produced a
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more sympathetic group of jurors. In sum, just as the
fundamental rights characterization could be applied
to many of the rights subject to counsel's control,_ so
could the characterization of a decision as strategic and
requiring counsel's expertise be applied to certain basic
determinations subject to defendant's control.
.
As various lower courts have noted, the determination that particular decisions do or do not require defendant's personal choice has obviously rested on a
balancing of several factors . The fundamental n~ture of
the right involved and the significance of strategic considerations obviously are two important considerations . Other factors given substantial weight appear to
· be the objective of avoiding the disruption of the litiga-

trial. "6 Still another concern of judicial administration is
that the trial judge be able to establish on the record,
without a lengthy, disruptive procedure, that the decisions subject to defendant's control were actually made
by the defendant. Without such a record, convictions
could readily be subject to challenge by defendants
claiming that counsel usurped the defendant's authority. The trial judge can readily determine that decisions
requiring the explicit waiver of rights (such as the
guilty plea) were made by the defendant himself, but
he is hardly in a position to "continually satisfy himself
that the defendant was fully informed as to, and in
complete accord with, his attorney's every action or inaction that involved any possible constitutional right. "7
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f.tion process, the "inherently personal c_har~cter" of the
particular decision, and the need to mamtam a strong
defense bar.
The court's concern with the possible disruption of
the litigation process is manifested most_clearly in_ .
opinions stressing the timing of the parti_c ular d~os10n.
The exercise of defendant's personal ch01ce requues an
opportunity for meaning~! co~sulta~o_n t~at often is
not consistent with the exigencies of litigation. Thus,
Justice Brennan, who would grant defendant far more
control than the Supreme Court majority, nevertheless
acknowledges that defense counsel must be given
"decisive authority... with regard to the hundreds of
decisions that must be made quickly in the course of a

Still another factor that has apparently influenced
the balancing process, though it tends to be cited more
frequently by commentators than courts, is the probability that defendant's interest in the particular decision
extends beyond simply presenting a successful defense . The client, it is often said, must be able to
control the "end," while the lawyer determines the
"means" for reaching that end. Where, as is usually the
case, the client's primary objective is to gain an acquittal, the lawyer is only controlling the means to that end
when he decides whether or not to advance certain
claims or raise particular objections . However, as to the
exercise of a few rights, the client may often have a
different or additional objective in mind . For example,

a defendant may have an interest in testifying himself
even though he recognizes that doing so may hurt_his
chances for acquittal (perhaps because cross-ex~m1nation will reveal his prior convictions). He may view as
more important his opportunity to "tell his story to
the public." Similarly, a defendant may want a prompt
trial, to relieve his anxiety, even though he recognizes
that delay might weaken the prosecution's evidence.
Decisions of this type are said to more appropriately
rest with the defendant because they have an "inherently personal" quality, reflecting defendant's interest
in controlling objectives rather than simply tactics. Of
course, a wide variety of decisions may have this quality under the circumstances of an individual case. The
courts have indicated, however, that they will judge the
decision in terms of the general nature of the interests
protected by the particular right. None have suggested, for example, that counsel will lose his control
over whether a suppression motion should be made
when the particular defendant's political beliefs make it
so important to him that police illegality be revealed
that he insists on the motion even though it might
work against the possibility of an acquittal.
Finally, the line drawn between "personal" and "strategic" decisions probably also reflects some concern
that lawyers not be placed in a position so inhibiting or
embarrassing, as it relates to their professional expertise, that they are discouraged from engaging in
criminal defense work. A lawyer is not placed in a
professionally embarrassing position when he is reluctantly required to try his case to a jury rather than a
judge. Neither should he be embarrassed because he is
required to go to trial in a weak case, since that decision is clearly attributed to his client. The situation
would be somewhat different, however, were a lawyer
required to raise a "colorable" procedural objection
simply because his client insisted that he do so. An objection may be "nonfrivolous" yet so unlikely to succeed that the lawyer who raises it will be viewed as
wasting the time of the court. If the lawyer were forced
to raise such a claim because of his client's insistence,
he could hardly inform the court that he was presenting the claim only because he was required to do so. So
too, if forced to present the testimony of an exceptionally weak witness, the lawyer could hardly inform
the jury that the witness was called at his client's direction. In the end, this concern that the lawyer not be
forced to sacrifice his professional reputation while
providing no true assistance to his client may explain,
as well as any other factor, the narrow range of decisions assigned to the control of the client. 8
~

Footnotes
1. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Faretta held that a defendant has a
constitutional right to proceed prose that cannot be conditioned on his ca-

pacity to perform at the level of a skilled attorney. Defendant is entitled to
represent himself provided he "knows what he is doing [in giving up his
right to counsel] and his choice is made with eyes open." While the framers
of the Constitution recognized the value of representation by counsel in as-
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suring that the defendant received a fair trial, they placed on a higher plane
the •inestimable worth of [defendant's] free choice ."
2. Our discussion deals only with those obligations of counsel that may require
reversal of a conviction when violated . Thus, though it is said in this regard
that the lawyer has no obligation to consult with his client as to those decisions over which counsel has exclusive control, he may nevertheless have
such an obligation to consult under standards of professional responsibility.
See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4 (Approved Draft,
1983). Consider also §20.3(b) as to the special obligations attending counsel's
advice on the entry of a guilty plea .
3. Of course, a defendant with a retained attorney can discharge his attorney
and look for another who will abide by his wishes . The indigent defendant
has no right to a substitute counsel where the disagreement with counsel
relates to a matter within the exclusive province of the lawyer. See §ll.4(b).
Thus his choice commonly is either to keep the counsel or proceed prose.
See §ll.4(d). The courts have not seen this distinction in the ability of the
non-indigent and indigent defendant to •control counsel' as raising a significant equal protection problem . Many non-indigents are not in a positon to
•shop around' for a lawyer more willing to accept the defendant's judgment
on matters of strategy. If the di agreement between counsel and client arises
at a point where substitution of new counsel can be achieved only with a
continuance, the non-indigent, like the indigent, may face the choice of proceeding prose or retaining his current counsel and accepting counsel's decisions. See §§11.4(c), (d). Moreover, just as equal protection has never been
thought to guarantee to the indigent a lawyer as experienced or skillful as
the best that a non-indigent might obtain , neither does it require a lawyer as
compliant in his relationship with his client as the most submissive attorney
a non-indigent may retain. See generally, State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz.
App. 458, 409 P.2d 742 (1962).
4. 463 U.S. 745.
5. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S.1 (1966). Brookhart held that defense counsel
could not enter an agreement, without defendant's informed consent, "that
all the state had to prove was a prima facie case, that he would not contest it,
and that there would be no cross-examination of witnesses ." The Court
noted that the defendant had desired to plead not guilty, but the counsel
had accepted a procedure largely inconsistent with such a plea. That procedure was characterized by Justice Harlan , in his concurring opinion, as
having "amounted almost to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."
6. See Jones v. Barnes, supra note 4 (Brennan,). , concurring). Justice Brennan
has argued against "a constitutional rule that encourages lawyers to disregard their clients' wishes without compelling need .• It is not clear what
factors other than the exigencies of litigation would establish such •compelling need ."
7. Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973). This is not to say, of course, that
a decision will be held to be within counsel's control simply because a record
of defendant's personal participation in the waiver is not easily established.
Whether to appeal is a decision for the defendant to make, though the
failure of counsel to file an appeal hardly indicates in itself (or readily permits a court to establish on the record) that defendant participated in that
decision. So too, while the exigencies of the trial process will contribute to
the assignment of certain decisions to counsel's bailiwick, the presence of
ample opportunity for consultation does not necessarily mean that the decision will be assigned to defendant's control. See e .g., /ones v. Barnes, supra
note 4, where, as Justice Brennan stressed in the dissent, there was ample
time for consultation. Defense counsel also would have had ample time before trial to discuss with defendant the possibility of raising many of the
objections considered in the cases cited in the sentence in the text following
note 5.
8. Even where an objection has a good chance of success, it might be viewed as
•wasteful flyspecking· when it relates to a point that will be of no tactical
benefit to the accused in the context of a particular case. Courts more often
stress the lack of benefit to the client than their concern for the lawyer's
reluctance to serve in a capacity in which he cannot exercise his professiona l
judgment. See Jones v. Barnes, supra note 4. But the two interests run together. See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting that "few
competent counsel would accept retainers or appointrnent .. •if [required] to
consult the defendant and follow his views on every issue of trial strategy
that might, often as a matter of hindsight, involve some claim of constitutional right").
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